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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Darin William Parton appeals from a judgment of conviction for attempted
strangulation and domestic battery, along with a persistent violator finding, entered after
a jury trial. Mr. Parton alleges the following errors on appeal: (1) that the district court
erred when it overruled his objections to the opinion testimony of Detective Matthew
Brechwald regarding jail telephone calls, (2) that the district court abused its discretion
when it admitted, as an excited utterance, a statement made by the victim after she had
fallen asleep, (3) that, even if the two errors complained of above are individually
harmless, the cumulative error doctrine requires reversal, (4) that the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury's finding that he was a persistent violator, and (5) that the
prosecutor violated Mr. Parton's Fifth Amendment rights when she improperly solicited
testimony as to his pre-arrest silence, his post-arrest invocation of his right to counsel,
and commented on his silence in her closing argument.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Parton proceeded to a jury trial on charges of attempted strangulation and
domestic battery, with a persistent violator enhancement.

(R., p.142.) The charges

involved an incident that purportedly occurred between Mr. Parton and his girlfriend,
Theresa Linnenburger, after a night of drinking at a bar near their home, a trailer. (Trial
Tr. Vol. 11 , p.64, L.10 - p.98, L.19.)

Five transcripts were prepared on appeal. "Trial Tr. Vol. I" refers to a 394 page
transcript lodged on January 3, 2011, which contains a hearing on a motion to
suppress, the sentencing hearing, and testimony from both days of the jury trial. "Trial
Tr. Vol. II" refers to a 56 page transcript lodged on July 20, 2011, which contains
opening statements, closing arguments, and the jury trial on Part II of the Information.
1
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Prior to trial, Mr. Parton moved to exclude a statement made to police officers by
Ms. Linnenburger.

Specifically, defense counsel argued that Ms. Linnenburger's

statement, made to Officers Moreno and Rosier, that her boyfriend had beaten her up
was hearsay, was not an excited utterance, and should not be testified to at trial by
either Officer Moreno or Officer Rosier. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, pA8, L.8 - p.51, L.10.) At the
hearing, both Ms. Linnenburger and Officer Moreno testified about the circumstances
surrounding the statement. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.23, L.18 - pA4, L.25.)
Ms. Linnenburger testified that, after the incident with Mr. Parton, she ran to a
police substation located across the street from their trailer.

Upon arriving at the

substation, she "knocked on the front door, and nobody answered. Walked toward the
back and noticed the police car was running ... and I pounded on the back door, and
nobody answered." She then returned to the front door, knocked on the door and again
received no response, so she "put [her] head down, thinking, they'll find me. They'll find
me. And I don't know if I fell asleep or what because I just hurt." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.26,
L.8 - p.27, L.24.)
According to Officer Moreno, he and his partner, Officer Rosier, were working the
graveyard shift when they stopped at the police substation on break.

While there,

Officer Moreno heard knocking, which he attributed to the ventilation system. Between
ten and thirty minutes after hearing the knocking, Officers Moreno and Rosier
discovered Ms. Linnenburger on the ground outside the door.

She was "in a fetal

position and was crying." One of the officers then asked her if she was okay, to which
she responded "that her boyfriend had beat her up." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.34, L.20 - pAO,
L.13.)
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In analyzing the issue, the district court addressed the circumstances identified in
State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279 (Ct. App. 2007) and State v. Parker, 112 Idaho 1
(1986).2

Ultimately, the district court, recognizing that admissibility was within its

discretion, held that it would only allow Ms. Linnenburger's initial statement that her
boyfriend had beaten her up, at which point further questioning converted the encounter
into a criminal investigation. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.52, L.3 - p.57, L.4.)
At trial, Officer Moreno testified about the statement as follows:
[Prosecutor:] What did you see when you went out the side door [of the
substation]?
[Moreno:]

There was a female on the ground, just near the entrance.
She was on the ground kind of in a fetal position.

[Prosecutor:] What did she first say to you?
[Moreno:]

She said "I need help," and then "My boyfriend beat me up."

(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.182, Ls.16-23.)
At trial, Ms. Linnenburger testified that, before the officers opened the door, "I
think I fell asleep because I remember being cold and just waiting and just waiting ... I
just remember waking up because I felt something hit my leg." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.122,
Ls.15-23.)
At trial, Ms. Linnenburger testified that she left the bar before Mr. Parton because
he was being "loudL]" "obnoxiousL]" and "flirting with everybody[.]" (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.76,

2 "To fall within this exception [excited utterance], there must be a startling event that
renders inoperative the normal reflective thought process of the observer, and the
declarant's statement must be a spontaneous reaction to that event rather than the
result of reflective thought. In considering whether a statement constitutes an excited
utterance, the totality of the circumstances must be considered, including the nature of
the startling condition or event, the amount of time that elapsed between the startling
event and the statement, the age and condition of the declarant, the presence or
absence of self-interest, and whether the statement was volunteered or made in
response to a question." Timmons, 145 Idaho at 285 (internal citations omitted).
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Ls.15-25.) On both direct and cross-examination, Ms. Linnenburger acknowledged that
she had lied under oath at the preliminary hearing. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.133, L.1 - p.134,
L.23, p.140, L.13 - p.141, L.9.) When asked what part of her sworn testimony at the
preliminary hearing was a lie, Ms. Linnenburger stated it was when she testified "[t]hat
he [Mr. Parton] didn't do anything to me." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.133, L.24 - p.134, L.1.)
The State also presented testimony from Detective Matthew Brechwald. That
testimony consisted of a lengthy recitation of his training and experience as a domestic
violence detective (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.298, L.15 - p.302, L.4), followed by his opinions
regarding the "evidentiary value" of three jail telephone calls that were made by
Mr. Parton to Ms. Linnenburger following his arrest.

(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.296, L.14 -

p.317, L.20.) Aside from listening to those jail telephone calls prior to trial, Detective
Brechwald took no part in the investigation of the case. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.314, LsA-12.)
Over defense counsel's objection, Detective Brechwald was allowed to testify that,
among other things, the calls represented the "type of manipulative efforts ... that, as a
domestic violence detective I'm always looking for, because that is ingrained in this type
of crime."

(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.317, Ls.17-20.)

The State did not offer Detective

Brechwald as an expert, and expressly disclaimed any reliance on Idaho Rule of
Evidence 702. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.315, Ls.16-17.)
The jury found Mr. Parton guilty of attempted strangulation and domestic battery.
(R., pp.96-97.)

The case then proceeded to a jury trial on the persistent violator

enhancement, with the State relying on two judgments of conviction for prior felonies,
and arguing that Mr. Parton was the same person as was named in those two
judgments. Defense counsel argued that the State had failed to establish, beyond a
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reasonable doubt, that Mr. Parton was the same person named in both judgments.
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.49, L.3 - p.56, L.8.)
Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Parton to be a persistent violator. (R., p.142.) On
the charge of attempted strangulation, Mr. Parton received a unified sentence of twentyfive years, with five years fixed,3 and on the charge of domestic battery, he received a
unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, to run concurrently with the
attempted strangulation sentence.

(R., p.143.)

Mr. Parton filed a Notice of Appeal

timely from the Judgment & Commitment. (R., p.148.)

3 Ten years of the twenty year indeterminate term were imposed based on the
persistent violator enhancement. (R., p.143.)
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ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err when it allowed Detective Brechwald to testify as an
expert about specifics of this case?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted, as an excited
utterance, a statement made by the victim to the police?

3.

Is Mr. Parton entitled to a new trial under the cumulative error doctrine?

4.

Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding that Mr. Parton was a
persistent violator?

5.

Did the prosecuting attorney violate Mr. Parton's Fifth Amendment rights when,
without objection, she solicited testimony as to his pre-arrest silence, his postarrest invocation of his right to counsel, and commented on his silence in her
closing argument?

6

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Allowed Detective Brechwald To Testify As An Expert
About The "Evidentiary Value" Of Jail Telephone Calls

A.

Introduction
Mr. Parton asserts that the district court erred when it allowed Detective

Brechwald to testify, over his objections on relevancy grounds and under Idaho Rules of
Evidence 701 and 702, as to his opinion about to the "evidentiary value" of jail
telephone calls made to the victim.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Allowed Detective Brechwald To Testify As An
Expert About The "Evidentiary Value" Of Jail Telephone Calls
At trial, the State presented Detective Matthew Brechwald to testify as to the

evidentiary significance of certain jail telephone calls placed by Mr. Parton to
Ms. Linnenburger. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.296, L.14 - p.317, L.20.) After establishing that
Detective Brechwald had extensive experience and training in investigating domestic
violence cases (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.298, L.15 - p.302, LA), and playing audio of three
phone calls, the following exchange occurred between the witness, the parties, and the
district court:

[The State:]

Detective Brechwald, in your review of these
telephone calls, based on your training and
experience as a domestic violence detective,
what evidentiary value, if any, did you find
these calls to have?

[Detective Brechwald:]

Actually, I found it to have significant
evidentiary value. To begin with, he makes
obvious attempts to influence her in how she's
going to proceed and how she's going to speak
with people who conduct follow-up
investigations in the prosecutor's office.
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In addition, he expresses his disappointment
that she did not make up a story about getting
in a fight with a chick in the bar.
In addition, he never denies that he did this.
think that's strong, compelling evidence in a
case like this.
And then beyond that, as she goes down the
list of the things that he did to her, he
acknowledges all those things. He says, "I
know, I know, I know."

[The State:]

Thank you, Detective Brechwald. Continue
with the evidentiary value of these three calls.

[Detective Brechwald:]

Well, as he responds to her saying what he
had done to her, you know, there's no denials.
He apologizes several times.

[Defense Counsel:]

Judge, continuing objection. The jury's heard
the calls. They are going to have the
opportunity to discuss it. I don't think they
need Detective Brechwald to tell them what the
calls said.

THE COURT:

So what's the purpose of the questioning?

[The State:]

This is, based on his training and experience
as a domestic violence detective, what
evidentiary value did he consider this piece of
evidence to have on his investigation.

THE COURT:

Based on his expertise in domestic violence?

[The State:]

Yes. And his investigation as a domestic
violence detective in this case - well, limited to
the calls.

[Defense Counsel:]

And it's been represented that he was not a
detective in this particular case. He's simply
offering an opinion with respect to these calls.
And the jury is entirely capable of drawing their
conclusions from having listened to them.
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THE COURT:

I think she's offering it as an expert opinion; is
that right, or what?

[The State:]

I mean, certainly I think he has expertise in the
area of domestic violence but I'm limiting, you
know, to those three calls that we heard, as a
detective what inferences or what evidentiary
value do these calls have.

THE COURT:

To assist the jury to understand; is that what
you're -

[The State:]

Well, Your Honor-

THE COURT:

Okay. In his investigation as a detective with
the Boise City Police Department, having
experience and expertise in the area of
domestic violence?

[The State:]

Yes. With regard to those three calls, were
they of evidentiary value?

THE COURT:

I think it's okay.

[Defense Counsel:]

Same objection, Judge. I don't think expert
testimony is at all necessary here, Judge. If he
was here testifying about the length of skid
marks and saying that that shows a car was
going so fast or here testifying about ballistics
or something of that nature. But this is within
the realm of human experience, and the jury
are [sic] the finders of facts. They're all adults
and they have experience with telephones and
human relationships. I think it is up to them to
determine what these calls say.

[The State:]

And I'm not offering him right now as an expert
under 702. He is a fact witness with regard to
these calls because he heard them with his
own ears. He wrote a police report about them
that's been provided to defense counsel. So
it's not an expert in terms of 702, but he does
have some additional expertise in the area that
would ultimately-

THE COURT:

So based on an investigation to determine
whether or not domestic violence occurred,
he's listened to these calls. And then he would
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draw some conclusions from that in
determining whether or not a person should or
should not be prosecuted or what?
[The State:]

Just what, if any, evidentiary value they had.
He wrote a police report regarding them, so I
could ask him why-

THE COURT:

I'm not sure this is much different than a DUI
evaluation. It seems to be in the realm of an
investigative officer's duty as to what evidence
they would look at in putting together a case.

[Defense Counsel:]

I'm not withdrawing the objection. You can rule
as you choose, but I maintain the objection.
But I think it is up to the jury to determine what
these calls mean to them. They are the
ultimate finders of fact. And having just
listened to them, I don't think they need
someone else to tell them what the calls said.

THE COURT:

I agree that it's up to the jury to determine what
weight they happen to give to all the evidence
as well as this officer's testimony, but "" allow
the officer to testify.
Go ahead.

[The State:]

I think that you've established several things.
Is there anything else that you know that you
haven't yet spoken about regarding evidentiary
value of these calls?

[Detective Brechwald:]

Yes. I think the nature of the manipulation that
you can hear in the call, with the threats to
hang himself and the threats to kill himself, and
kind of switching the momentum in the
relationship to where he's the victim and she
should be worried about him; because of all of
this, now he's going to hang himself in the
shower. And garnering promises that she will
stand by him, making extreme efforts to make
sure that she maintains the relationship,
making suggestions that - don't let somebody
else come in and screw up this relationship;
long will you stand by me for; you have to
stand by me. Those type of manipulative
efforts are something that, as a domestic

how
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violence detective I'm always looking for,
because that is ingrained in this type of crime.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.312, L.7 - p.317, L.20 (emphases added).)
It is important to note that defense counsel's objections to the testimony of
Detective Brechwald were as follows: (1) relevance, (2) calling for opinion testimony of
an expert when it would not assist the trier of fact, and (3) calling for opinion testimony
by a lay witness when it was not appropriate to do so. While the language used in
making the objections could hardly be described as a model of clarity, it is obvious that
defense counsel's first objection, in which he argued that the jury did not need Detective
Brechwald's testimony in order to understand what the calls meant (Trial Tr. Vol. I,
p.313, Ls.16-20), was an objection on relevance grounds.

It is equally obvious that

defense counsel's responses to the State's argument (that the purpose of the
questioning was "based on his training and experience as a domestic violence
detective, what evidentiary value did he consider this piece of evidence to have on his
investigation" (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.313, L.21 - p.314, L.1)), that "[h]e's simply offering an
opinion with respect to these calls" and "I don't think expert testimony is at all necessary
here" (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.314, L.7 - p.315, L.15), were objections made under Idaho
Rules of Evidence 701 and 702.
The first question, then, is whether the testimony to which defense counsel
objected was relevant.

Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." I. R. E. 401. When
asked the purpose of the questions and testimony to which defense counsel objected,
the State responded, "This is, based on his training and experience as a domestic
violence detective, what evidentiary value did he consider this piece of evidence to have
11

on his investigation." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.313, L.21 - p.314, L.1.) The relevance of the
evidence, as advanced by the State, the proponent of that evidence, was that it was
relevant to show the effect that it had on Detective Brechwald's investigation.

The

question, then, becomes whether Detective Brechwald's feelings about his investigation
was a relevant fact of consequence to a determination of the action. This question can
best be answered by looking at the facts of State v. Boehner, 114 Idaho 311 (Ct. App.
1988).
In Boehner, the Idaho Court of Appeals considered the trial court's decision to
allow testimony from police officers concerning previous statements about hurting police
officers purportedly made by the defendant and relayed to officers by dispatch.
Boehner was charged with assault with intent to commit a serious felony upon a law
enforcement officer after he shot in the direction of police officers who had surrounded
his house while seeking to arrest him for an earlier incident.
At trial, the State elicited testimony that officers, in preparing to surround
Boehner's home to effect the arrest, had learned from dispatch that "Boehner previously
had expressed a desire to 'kill a cop.'" Id., 114 Idaho at 312. Defense counsel objected
to the testimony on the grounds that it was inadmissible hearsay, unfairly prejudicial,
and lacked a proper foundation. The trial court ruled that it was not hearsay because it
was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, instead holding that it was
admissible for non-hearsay purposes as "it was offered for the limited purpose of
showing what information the officers possessed and how this information 'might bear
on the subsequent actions of the officers.'" Id., 114 Idaho at 313-14.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals determined that the trial court erred when it held
that the testimony was admissible for a non-hearsay purpose because that non-hearsay
12

purpose was not relevant to the case. In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals
explained,
[T]he question becomes whether the evidence was relevant in light of its
ascribed purpose. We think it was not. Evidence is relevant only if it
tends to prove or disprove "a fact of consequence to the determination of
the action." I.R.E. 401. In this case, the facts of consequence during the
state's case-in-chief were facts bearing on the elements of the offense
charged. Among these elements, the prosecutor was required to prove
Boehner's state of mind - that is, a specific intent to shoot a police officer.
The prosecutor was not required to prove the officers' collective state of
mind. Evidence of the motives for their actions on the night in question did
not prove any element of the offense charged.

Id., 114 Idaho at 314.
As in Boehner, the facts of consequence in this case were those that bore upon
the elements of the offenses charged.

Detective Brechwald's testimony concerning

what evidentiary significance three jail telephone calls had with respect to his
investigation of those phone calls was not relevant to any element of the charged
crimes. As such, their admission, over a relevancy objection, was erroneous.
The second question is whether, assuming, arguendo, that the evidence was
otherwise relevant, the opinion testimony of Detective Brechwald was admissible under
either Rule 701 or 702.

With respect to any argument under Rule 702, the State

expressly disclaimed that as a basis for admissibility when it argued, "I'm not offering
him right now as an expert under 702." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.315, Ls.16-17.) Furthermore,
the Idaho appellate courts have set forth the following limitation on the admissibility of
both expert and lay opinion testimony under Rules 701 and 702:
[B]oth expert and lay opinions are subject to the restriction that when the
question is one which can be decided by persons of ordinary experience
and knowledge, it is for the trier of fact to decide. The court of jury must
weigh the truth of the facts presented by the witnesses and draw its
conclusions by the exercise of independent judgment and reasoning
powers, without hearing the opinions of witnesses.
13

State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 855 (Ct. App. 1991) (internal citation omitted).

With respect to whether it was admissible under Rule 701 as being "helpful to a
clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in
issue," Mr. Parton asserts that his argument above, based on Boehner, that the
evidence was not relevant applies with equal force to any claim that the evidence would
be helpful, under Rule 701, in making a determination as to a fact in issue.
Additionally, although the State claimed that it was not offering Detective
Brechwald as an expert, it is clear from the State's argument4 and the presentation of
Detective Brechwald's background that the State was relying on his specialized
knowledge of domestic violence, which is expressly prohibited when offering a lay
witness' opinion under Rule 701.
Considering the inflammatory nature of Detective Brechwald's comments,
including describing Mr. Parton's calls as examples of the "type of manipulative efforts
'"

that, as a domestic violence detective I'm always looking for, because that is

ingrained in this type of crime" (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.317, Ls.17-20), along with the fact that
the purported victim admitted to having committed perjury5 at the preliminary hearing
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.133, L.1 - p.134, L.23, p.140, L.13 - p.141, L.g), it would be
impossible for this Court to conclude that any such error in admitting his testimony was

I n arguing for the admissibility of Detective Brechwald's testimony about the
evidentiary value of the telephone calls, the State, while expressly disclaiming any
reliance on Rule 702, emphasized his "expertise in the area" of domestic violence, as
well as his "training and experience as a domestic violence detective[.]" (Trial Tr. Vol. I,
r.313, L.21 - p.315, L.23.)
The State, in its closing argument, acknowledged that Ms. Linnenburger committed
perjury at the preliminary hearing. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.30, LS.5-8 ("Despite, essentially,
the perjury that she committed at the preliminary hearing in this case, the reasons to
believe Teresa far outweigh the reasons not to believe her").)
4
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harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, Mr. Parton respectfully requests that
this Court vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial.

II.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted, As An Excited Utterance, A
Statement Made By The Victim To The Police After She Fell Asleep
A.

Introduction
Mr. Parton asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted,

as an excited utterance, a statement made by the victim to the police. Specifically, he
contends that the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that she fell asleep
between the exciting incident and the utterance, does not support a finding that the
statement was an excited utterance.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision as to whether to admit a "statement as an excited utterance is

within the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 567 (2007)
(citations omitted).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted, As An Excited
Utterance, A Statement Made By The Victim To The Police
Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(2) provides that "[a] statement relating to a startling

event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused
by the event or condition" is not excluded by the general rule prohibiting the use of
hearsay. I.R.E. 803(2).
The Idaho Court of Appeals summarized the law concerning the excited
utterance exception as follows:
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To fall within this exception, there must be a startling event that renders
inoperative the normal reflective thought process of the observer, and the
declarant's statement must be a spontaneous reaction to that event rather
than the result of reflective thought. In considering whether a statement
constitutes an excited utterance, the totality of the circumstances must be
considered, including the nature of the startling condition or event, the
amount of time that elapsed between the startling event and the
statement, the age and condition of the declarant, the presence or
absence of self-interest, and whether the statement was volunteered or
made in response to a question.
Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 285 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal citations omitted). As the Utah

Court of Appeals has explained, "The classic example of an excited utterance is a
witness's exact recollection of the declarant's spontaneous 'sound bite' - an uncoached
blurting out - made while the declarant observed the exciting event or closely
thereafter." West Valley City v. Hutto, 5 P.3d 1,4 (Utah Ct. App. 2000).
At the hearing on the admissibility of the statement as an excited utterance,
Officer Moreno testified that either he or Officer Rosier made the first statement in the
encounter with Ms. Linnenburger, asking her whether she was okay, upon seeing her
on the ground outside the police substation. Officer Moreno testified, "I believe that's
when she state[d] that her boyfriend had beat[enJ her up." The officers then asked
follow-up questions while waiting for paramedics.

(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.38, L.16 - p.41,

L.20.) Ms. Linnenburger testified that, after unsuccessfully attempting to get help from
the police substation, "I just put my head down, thinking, they'll find me. They'll find me.
And I don't know if I fell asleep or what because I just hurt." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.27, Ls.2124.) At trial, Ms. Linnenburger further explained, "I just remember waking up because I
felt something hit my leg." When asked what it was that hit her leg, she responded, "I
think it was the door." (TriaITr. Vol. I, p.122, L19-p.123, L.1.)
Considering the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that Ms. Linnenburger's
statement was not an excited utterance. Mr. Parton does not dispute that the nature of
16

the startling event was something that could have produced an excited utterance.
However, Mr. Parton does contend that a statement made by an adult6 victim of
domestic violence, who fell asleep between the startling event and the making of the
statement, cannot be an excited utterance. See Smith v. State, 669 A.2d 1, 4-5 (Del.
1995) (finding that it was "clear" that a statement made by the defendant who "was fast
asleep when the police arrived and had to be awoken in order to be taken into custody"
following a domestic dispute was not an excited utterance); State v. Devall, 489 N.W.2d
371, 374-75 (S.D. 1992) (statements made by adult rape victim after waking up the
morning after the incident were not excited utterances, nor were those made after a
later nap). Additionally, the fact that the statement was made in response to a question
is a circumstance that cuts against classifying the statement as an excited utterance.
See Timmons, 145 Idaho at 285 (one circumstance to be considered is "whether the
statement was volunteered or made in response to a question").
Considering the victim's perjury at the preliminary hearing and the he-said-she
said nature of the State's case, Mr. Parton asserts that it would be impossible for this
Court to conclude that the error in admitting the victim's statement was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, Mr. Parton respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial.

6 Many courts appear to have adopted what can best be termed as a child witness
exception to the general rule that a person who sleeps between the startling event and
the statement is no longer experiencing the excitement related to the event. See
State v. Kinross, 906 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (finding excited utterance
despite two year old victim having slept for twenty minutes between event and
statement); State v. Wallace, 524 N.E.2d 466,470 (Ohio 1988) (five year old victim who
made statement fifteen hours after assault and who had been in and out of
consciousness during the intervening hours); Smith v. State, 798 S.W.2d 94, 97-98
(Ark. 1990) (three year old witness to his aunt's violent murder who made statements
after he "slept fitfully and cried and screamed during the night").
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1/1.

Mr. Parton Is Entitled To A New Trial Under The Cumulative Error Doctrine
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds the errors set forth in sections I and /I
to have been individually harmless, Mr. Parton asserts that the errors combined amount
to cumulative error.

The cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of

irregularities, each of which alone might be harmless, but when aggregated, show the
absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to due
process.

State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002).

In order to find

cumulative error, this Court must first decide that there is merit to more than one of the
claims of error before determining whether these errors, when aggregated, denied
Mr. Parton a fair trial. State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999). Under the
cumulative error doctrine, even when individual errors are deemed harmless, an
accumulation of such errors may deprive a defendant of a fair trial. State v. Martinez,
125 Idaho 445,453 (1994).
Based on the fact that two errors occurred in his trial, the doctrine of cumulative
error can be applied, and, in light of the weaknesses in the State's case, reversal of his
convictions with a new trial is warranted. The argument and authority in support of the
asserted errors are set forth in sections I and /I, and are incorporated herein by
reference.

IV.
The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support The Jury'S Finding That Mr. Parton Was A
Persistent Violator
Part /I of the Information accused Mr. Parton of being a persistent violator, in
relevant part, as follows:
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That the said Defendant, DARIN WILLIAM PARTON, on or about the 1st
day of March of 1995, was convicted of the crime of Assault in the 3 rd
Degree, a Felony, in the County of Pierce, State of Washington by virtue
of that certain Judgment of Conviction made and entered by [the]
Honorable Judge Waldo F. Stone in case number 95-1-00028-4.

II
That the said Defendant, DARIN WILLIAM PARTON, on or about the 5th
day of January, 2005, was convicted of the crime of Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver, a Felony, in the County of
Canyon, State of Idaho by virtue of that certain Judgment of Conviction
made and entered by [the] Honorable Judge Renae J. Hoff in case
number CR2005-9945-C.
(R., p.46 (bold type in original).)
At jury trial on Part II, State's Exhibits 32 and 33 were admitted without objection.
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.51, L.11 - p.53, L.9.) State's Exhibit 32 is a certified true copy of a
document in Cause No. 95-1-00028-4 entitled Judgment and Sentence (Felony), issued
by the Superior Court of Pierce County, Washington and signed by Judge Waldo F.
Stone on March 1, 1995. The defendant in that document is described in the caption as
"DARIN WILLIAM PARTON" with a date of birth of

The last page of the

document contains what purport to be four fingerprints from the right hand of a Darin
William Parton with the same date of birth as in the caption.

No other identifying

information, including a Social Security Number? or physical description, is contained in
the document. (State's Exhibit 32.) Officer Rosier testified in the first part of trial that
Mr. Parton's date of birth is eith

. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.256, L.25 -

p.257, L.12.)

? The State conceded as much when, in argument to the jury, it stated that the "[s]ocial
security number on this is unknown." (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.54, Ls.5-10.)
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In its closing argument on Part II, the State argued that, despite the absence of a
Social Security Number or any additional identifying information,8 State's Exhibit 32
contained sufficient information, in the form of a name and date of birth, to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Parton was the person named in that document.
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.54, Ls.1-12.) In his closing argument, defense counsel argued that
the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that both exhibits "relate to this
Darin Parton" and pointed out the absence of a Social Security Number in State's
Exhibit 32. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.55, L.22 - p.56, L.8.)
Idaho Code § 19-2514 provides:
Any person convicted for the third time of the commission of a felony,
whether the previous convictions were had within the state of Idaho or
were had outside the state of Idaho, shall be considered a persistent
violator of the law, and on such third conviction shall be sentenced to a
term in the custody of the state board of correction which term shall be for
not less than five (5) years and said term may extend to life.
Id.
Although it does not charge a separate crime or offense, State v. Salazar, 95
Idaho 650, 651 (1973), the State must prove the persistent violator enhancement
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant is entitled to a jury trial on the issue.
State v. Cheatham, 139 Idaho 413,416 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Dunn, 44 Idaho
636 (1927), and quoting State v. Lovejoy, 60 Idaho 632 (1939». Both the existence of
the prior convictions and the identity of the defendant as the person so convicted must
be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Lovejoy, 60 Idaho at 637.

8 No testimony or other evidence was presented concerning the fingerprints contained
in State's Exhibit 32, nor were the fingerprints discussed in either party's closing
argument. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.50, L. 7 - p.56, L.8.)
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If the record does not contain substantial evidence that the defendant is the
same as the person named in a judgment of conviction relied upon to establish the
persistent violator finding, then the persistent violator finding must be vacated. State v.
Medrain, 143 Idaho 329, 332 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted). "For evidence to be

substantial, it must be of sufficient quality that reasonable minds could reach the same
conclusion." State v. Johnson, 131 Idaho 808,809 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bott v. Idaho
State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580,586 (1996)).

No set formula appears to exist for what constitutes substantial evidence to
establish the identity of the defendant as the person named in a previous judgment of
conviction in a persistent violator trial.

"A judgment of conviction bearing the same

name as the defendant, with nothing more, is insufficient to establish the identity of the
person formerly convicted beyond a reasonable doubt."

Medrain, 143 Idaho at 332

(citing State v. Martinez, 102 Idaho 875, 880 (Ct. App. 1982)).

A judgment of

conviction, accompanied by mug shots and fingerprints, along with testimony that those
fingerprints were similar to the defendant's, was sufficient to establish that the
defendant was the person named in the judgment of conviction. Martinez, 102 Idaho at
880.
Interpreting the sufficiency of evidence supporting identification of the defendant
as the subject of a prior DUI conviction under the felony DUI statute, the Idaho Court of
Appeals recently held that "the evidence of the previous conviction establishing the
same name, same date of birth, same offense, and same county of conviction is
sufficient to establish identity beyond reasonable doubt." State v. Lawyer, 150 Idaho
170, 174 (Ct. App. 2010). Obviously, if the same name and date of birth alone were
sufficient to establish the identity of the defendant as the subject of the earlier
21

conviction, then the Court of Appeals' consideration of the same offense and same
county of conviction would have been unnecessary in resolving the issue.

Clearly,

therefore, something more than a judgment bearing the same name and date of birth as
the defendant is necessary.
Mr. Parton asserts that the felony conviction for Assault in the Third Degree, set
forth in State's Exhibit 32, is not supported by substantial evidence that he is the person
named therein, and, as such, the finding that he was a persistent violator must be
vacated. Mr. Parton asserts that a judgment of conviction containing merely the same
name and a possible date of birth match,9 without a Social Security Number, a
fingerprint comparison, a mug shot, or some other evidence of identity is not sufficient to
support a finding that he is the person named in the judgment of conviction.
Furthermore, the conviction that is set forth in State's Exhibit 32 was not even in the
same state, let alone the same county, nor was it the same offense, as either of the
charges for which he was convicted in this case, so those factors that were found
sufficient in Lawyer are not present.
Mr. Parton respectfully requests that this Court vacate the persistent violator
finding, and enter a judgment of acquittal on the enhancement.

Furthermore, if this

Court denies Mr. Parton's request for a new trial, made in the other sections of his brief,
he requests that this Court remand this matter for resentencing without the
enhancement.

Appellate counsel describes the date of birth as a possible match based on Officer
Rosier's testimony that Mr. Parton's date of birth is eith
.

9
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V.

The Prosecutor Violated Mr. Parton's Fifth Amendment Rights When She Elicited
Testimony Concerning His Pre-Arrest Silence And His Post-Arrest Invocation Of The
Right To Counsel And Commented On His Pre-Arrest Silence In Her Closing Argument

A.

Introduction
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, "No person ...

shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]" U.S. CONST.
amend. V.

Similarly, the Idaho Constitution guarantees that "[n]o person shall

0"

be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]" 10. CONST. art. I, §13.
Mr. Parton asserts that it was fundamental error in violation of his Fifth
Amendment rights when the prosecutor elicited testimony concerning his pre-arrest
silence, his post-arrest invocation of his right to counsel, and when, in her closing
argument, she commented on his silence. Consistent with this Court's recent decision
in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (Idaho 2010), because the comments were not followed
by contemporaneous objections, Mr. Parton must satisfy a three-prong test in order to
prevail on appeal. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.

B.

The Three-Prong Test Under Perry
The new standard of review for unobjected to error set forth in Perry is as follows:
If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it
shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental
error doctrine. Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the
defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists; and (3) was not harmless. If the
defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained of error
satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and
remand.

Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
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C.

The Prosecutor Violated Mr. Parton's Fifth Amendment Rights When She Elicited
Testimony Concerning His Pre-Arrest Silence And His Post-Arrest Invocation Of
The Right To Counsel And Commented On His Pre-Arrest Silence In Her Closing
Argument

1.

The Misconduct

There were three instances in which the State violated Mr. Parton's Fifth
Amendment rights to silence and counsel.

The first occurred during the direct

examination of Officer Moreno, the second during the direct examination of Officer
Rosier, and the third during the prosecutor's closing argument.
The portion of Officer Moreno's testimony that violated Mr. Parton's Fifth
Amendment rights occurred in the context of his testimony concerning the arrest of
Mr. Parton.

Officer Moreno testified that upon encountering Mr. Parton asleep in the

bedroom of the trailer, "we ... placed him in custody" and in handcuffs. Mr. Parton, who
appeared to be highly intoxicated to the point of being incoherent, then became "visibly
upset." Officer Moreno further testified that someone had found Mr. Parton's driver's
license in his wallet. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.195, L.20 - p.197, L.21.)
The prosecuting attorney then questioned Officer Moreno in greater detail about
the encounter:
[Prosecutor:] After, did he acknowledge that that was, in fact, his driver's
license?
[Moreno:]

He was very uncooperative with us. I don't think he even
ever acknowledged that was him and that was his driver's
license. Just very uncooperative with us.

[Prosecutor:] Did you determine that was his driver'S license?
[Moreno:]

Yes.

[Prosecutor:] How?
[Moreno:]

Just by his picture.
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[Prosecutor:] When you say he was uncooperative with you, what do you
mean? What did that look like?
[Moreno:]

Again, he was visibly angered, angry, and just not wanting we would ask him to stand up and he wouldn't. He'd make
his body limp and not being very cooperative.

[Prosecutor:] And did he make any statements regarding why you were
there or the events of the evening?
[Moreno:]

As I recall, the only statement that I recall him making is that
he didn't know what was going on.

[Prosecutor:] And at some point was he under arrest?
[Moreno:]

Yes.

[Prosecutor:] And for what was he under arrest?
[Moreno:]

For domestic battery and attempted strangulation.

[Prosecutor:] Why was he under arrest at that time?
[Moreno:]

Just based on Theresa's statements, her injuries and his
lack of statements to us, telling us exactly what happened.

(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.198, L.12 - p.199, L.17 (emphases added).)
The portion of Officer Rosier's testimony that implicated Mr. Parton's Fifth
Amendment rights occurred when the prosecutor questioned Officer Rosier about
statements that Mr. Parton made while being transported to jail. That exchange was as
follows:
[Prosecutor:] And did he make any statements on the way to the jail?
[Rosier:]

He did.

[Prosecutor:] Tell the jury about those.
[Rosier:]

He stated that he wanted to know what was going on. We'd
told him several times up to this point what had been taking
place, but he asked again, and I said because he didn't
understand his rights that I wasn't going to talk to him. And
at one point, he said he understood his rights and wanted to
know what was going on, which at that point, I explained
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being arrested for domestic battery. And I believe he said
that nothing happened, at which point I said "Do you
remember beating up your girlfriend?" And at that time, he
said he wanted his attorney and so I stopped asking him
questions at that time.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.250, Ls.5-21 (emphasis added).)
The misconduct in closing argument occurred when the prosecutor, argued, "He
didn't acknowledge or provide any explanation for the significant injuries to this [sic]
face. And you saw those pictures. Those are significant injures that he had." (Trial Tr.
Vol. II, p.30, Ls.15-18.)

2.

The Three-Prong Analysis

Disposing of the first prong of the Perry analysis - whether the misconduct
violated one of Mr. Parton's unwaived constitutional rights - is easy. With respect to
Officer Moreno's testimony concerning Mr. Parton's pre-arrest silence, the law in Idaho
is well-established that a defendant's "Fifth Amendment right not to have their silence
used against them in a court proceeding is applicable pre-arrest and pre-Miranda
warnings." State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814,820 (1998).
As for Officer Rosier's testimony about Mr. Parton's post-arrest invocation of his
Fifth Amendment right to counsel,10 such testimony also violated Mr. Parton's Fifth
Amendment rights. See State v. Dearman, 422 P.2d 573, 575 (Kan. 1967) ("[E]vidence
disclosing that one charged with [a] crime has asserted his constitutional right to

10 As the Idaho Court of Appeals recently explained in State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430
(Ct. App. 2011), "Strictly speaking, there is no 'Fifth Amendment right to counsel.'
Instead ... the right to be informed of and to the presence and assistance of counsel is
afforded in custodial contexts, in limited circumstances, in order to protect a suspect's
Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination during interrogation. The
term has evolved as a shorthand way of describing the right involved." Id., 151 Idaho at
431 n.2 (internal citation omitted).
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counsel ... cannot be used against him substantively as an admission of guilt.

It is

reversible error to permit a jury to draw an inference adverse to one accused of [a]
crime from his reliance upon his constitutional right to silence and to the advice of
counsel.").
Finally, the prosecutor's comment on Mr. Parton's silence violated the rule that
"[i]n a criminal case, a prosecutor may not directly or indirectly comment on a
defendant's invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent, either at trial or before
trial, for the purposes of inferring guilt." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App.
2007) (citations omitted).
With respect to Officer Moreno's testimony, it is difficult to imagine the relevance
of testimony concerning whether Mr. Parton ever acknowledged a driver's license found
in his wallet containing his photograph was his. The question as to why he was under
arrest was completely irrelevant, and resulted in Officer Moreno's statement about
Mr. Parton's "lack of statements" helping to provide probable cause for his arrest. Both
were completely unnecessary, and could have been avoided had the prosecutor simply
avoided asking questions that were likely to result in inadmissible testimony.
As for Officer Rosier's testimony concerning Mr. Parton's invocation of his right to
counsel, again, it is difficult to understand why a prosecutor would ask an open-ended
question about statements made by Mr. Parton knowing that the statements ended with
an invocation of the right to counsel. The broad scope of the question was completely
unnecessary, and, again, resulted in the admission of testimony that was improper and
in violation of Mr. Parton's Fifth Amendment rights. See State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho
53, 61 (2011) (finding no relevance to the prosecutor's question, "And so you did not
interview him?", and rejecting the State's argument that because the police officer
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witness provided the answer that mentioned the defendant's post-arrest silence, it
should not be considered prosecutorial misconduct; also holding that "when an officer of
the State gives any unsolicited testimony that is gratuitous and prejudicial to the
defendant, that testimony will be imputed to the State for the purposes of determining
prosecutorial misconduct") (emphasis added).
Finally, the prosecutor inexplicably referred directly to Mr. Parton's silence when
she argued that his failure to explain his injuries was evidence of his guilt. Such an
argument was improper, irrelevant, and violated Mr. Parton's Fifth Amendment right to
silence.
With respect to whether the error was plain, Mr. Parton submits that, considering
the clarity of the law on this subject, along with the fact that there could have been no
reasonable strategic basis for defense counsel not to have objected, it is clear that the
error was plain. Considering the final prong, whether there is a reasonable possibility
that the misconduct affected the verdict, the weaknesses in the State's case, as noted
in sections I and " (including the complaining witness' admitted perjury in an earlier
proceeding in this case), as well as the fact that Mr. Parton did not testify at trial,
establish that the three references to his exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights could
reasonably have affected the verdict. Mr. Parton asserts that because he has satisfied

Perris three-prong test, this Court should vacate his convictions and remand this
matter for a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in sections I, II, III, and V herein, Mr. Parton respectfully
requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the
district court for a new trial.

Additionally, for the reasons set forth in section IV,

Mr. Parton respectfully requests that this Court vacate the persistent violator finding,
and enter a judgment of acquittal as to the enhancement, with a remand to the district
court for resentencing if this Court does not order a new trial on the underlying charges.
DATED this 3 rd day of November, 2011.

SP~ER J. HAHN

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

29

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of November, 2011, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
DARIN WILLIAM PARTON
INMATE # 80478
ICC
PO BOX 70010
BOISE ID 83707
DARLA S WILLIAMSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
200 WEST FRONT STREET
BOISE 10 83702
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
200 W FRONT ST
BOISE ID 83702
STATEHOUSE MAIL
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATIORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE 10 83720-0010
Hand deliver to the Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court.

EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

SJH/eas

30

